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The political economy of  
low carbon energy in Kenya
Climate Compatible Development in Kenya
Is it possible for Kenya to 
simultaneously tackle energy 
poverty, contribute to climate 
change mitigation and reduce 
exposure to climate vulnerability?
There is growing international focus on how to support more 
integrated approaches to addressing climate change in ways that 
capture synergies and minimise the trade-offs between climate 
change mitigation, adaptation and development. These aims  
are embodied in the concept of climate compatible development 
(CCD).1 But what does this look like in practice in Kenya?
With a National Action Plan on Climate Change, a Vision 2030 
Strategy, a new constitution and a revised Energy Policy, Kenya  
is at critical cross-roads with respect to defining its energy future 
for the years to come. The challenge is to enable a just transition 
to a lower carbon economy that delivers poverty reduction and 
climate resilience at the same time. But thinking about who  
sets the terms of transition and for whom, raises key political 
questions about the role of actors, interests and institutions  
in the energy sector. In other words, who has the power to  
power change?
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This note summarises some recent work on the political 
economy of CCD supported by the Climate and Development 
Knowledge Network.2  It aims to understand the role of politics, 
actors and institutions in enabling or frustrating the pursuit of 
climate compatible energy development in Kenya. 
The energy sector in Kenya represents a fascinating case of  
the potential and limits of CCD in practice. Renewable energy 
potentially meets not only mitigation aims, but may also reduce 
vulnerability to climate change and bring tangible benefits to 
poorer groups. For some, solar power in particular offers hope  
of CCD building on a successful market for off-grid solar 
technologies in the country.3 Kenya is among the countries with 
the lowest rate of access to modern energy services in Africa and 
the world. Other drivers include both energy price vulnerability 
and the climate vulnerability of electricity production. Droughts 
have long affected hydro capacity and increased the price of 
energy. Economic vulnerabilities such as the volatility of oil  
prices and currency exchange rates provide further  
incentives to expand renewable energy sources.
Kenya presents a relatively rare case in which national energy 
security goals (such as cheap and reliable electricity generation) 
can be seen by both government and donors to be better served 
by renewable energy technologies than by fossil fuels. With a 
fragile grid, and some of the highest energy costs in region, a 
variety of drivers align to make ‘clean’ energy and lower carbon 
options more attractive.
This apparent win-win for climate and development has to be set, 
however, against news of recent oil and gas discoveries that have 
generated  excitement in the country, but that may slow the 
embrace of renewable energy.
This is a critical time for Kenya in deciding its energy future and 
whether and how it will aim to make it ‘climate compatible’. Issues 
of power and political economy will play a key role in determining 
technological and social outcomes: the winners and losers from 
different energy pathways and on whose terms and how the 
trade-offs between competing policy objectives are resolved.  
This is the value of political economy analysis - to understand  
the potential for energy systems to meet climate, development 
and adaptation needs simultaneously in a given political context.
Envisioning a Different Future For Kenya’s leaders, energy  
is recognised as a key pillar of development, and the current 
constraints on energy supply threaten national goals of economic 
growth. Kenya’s Vision 2030 aims to transform Kenya into “a 
newly industrialising, middle-income country providing a high 
quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and secure environment”. 
As in many other countries, cheap energy sources are central to 
this vision. Yet the climate compatible development of energy 
resources requires us to ask difficult questions about the pursuit 
of cheap energy sources. Do they exacerbate climate change?  
Do they leave Kenya and its citizens more vulnerable to economic 
and environmental uncertainties? Whose vision of development 
is served by the production and distribution of different types  
of energy? 
Integrating Policy One of the most important visions of energy 
development in Kenya is provided by the draft National Energy 
Policy (third draft). The policy refers to renewable energy as 
having the potential to “enhance energy security, mitigate 
climate change, generate income, create employment and 
generate foreign exchange savings”.  
However, fossil fuels are also given a prominent role in the 
country’s energy matrix, and the Policy reveals the “excitement” 
caused by the recent discovery of oil in Northern Kenya and the 
subsequent need “to develop adequate petroleum production 
capacity in the country”. Coal too is defined as having “the 
potential to become the most reliable and easily accessible 
energy source for electricity generation”. Renewable energies  
are seen as important as far as they can complement the 
country’s energy portfolio and provide energy security.
Projected Carbon Intensity of Kenya’s Electricity Grid  
Source: World Bank 20124
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Tackling Poverty
Energy for the Poor or Energy for Industry? All energy 
consumers are interested in lowering energy prices – big 
industrial companies, small businesses, wealthy consumers and 
the poorest for whom prices are prohibitive for even the most 
basic needs. The pressures to reduce energy prices in Kenya are  
a top political priority, featuring heavily in election promises and 
Presidential decries. Despite the emphasis on price and 
affordability, many government statements around energy do  
not refer to energy access for the poor. Rather, the price of energy 
for industry and creating additional capacity are the overriding 
concerns as reflected in the Least Cost Power Development Plan 
(LCPDP) (2011-2030). While it is fair to assume that economic 
growth will require reliable supplies of energy, experience from 
Kenya and around the world suggests that reducing energy 
poverty will not be achieved by narrow efforts to reduce  
energy prices.
The Kenyan Government plans 5000MW additional capacity 
within 4 years by 2017 from a base of 1500MW. Such ambitious 
targets mean that all energy sources – renewable and non-
renewable, are on the cards. But some technologies fit the 
requirements of speed and scale in order to meet such targets 
better than others. These include geothermal, gas, coal and 
diesel. While geothermal provides a clean energy source at  
scale, there is potential for interest in geothermal to ‘crowd out’ 
attention to other forms of renewable energy. The attractiveness 
of renewables is assessed by their affordability compared with 
fossil fuels, their compatibility with grid expansion plans and their 
ability to serve broader growth objectives through their revenue 
generation potential. 
Which poor? If there is a confluence of agendas around ‘clean 
energy’ and energy security, the trade-offs between energy 
security and energy access are perhaps more stark. There are 
competing representations of which policies and interventions 
serve the poor. Some policies clearly do not – without grid 
connection, generation capacity makes little difference. And 
without income generating potential from electricity the rural 
poor are unlikely to ever be able to pay for grid connected 
electricity for basic needs or productive uses. This is especially  
the case given the current pursuit of cost recovery principles for 
connection and service delivery. 
Supporting or suffocating solar? Given the apparent success 
story of off-grid solar technologies in Kenya, there has been a high 
level of interest in increasing the capacity for generating solar 
energy. Politics again is critical to understanding why this 
potential has not been realised to date. While there are initiatives 
to promote solar though measures like the Feed-in-Tariff, the 
government is cautious about locking consumer into high cost 
solar for 20 years through long term purchasing agreements.  
The quote below from the Ministry of Energy (MoE) bears this out:
‘Organisations and development agencies dealing with solar 
mainly focus on small projects that have no major impact.. 
investors are more concerned about making quick returns rather 
than large scale impact and transformation of poor people’s lives. 
This is why they complain about feed in tariffs being low. The 
government thinks these tariffs are reasonable both for 
consumers and investors. This is the reason why solar production 
is low. The government does not want consumers to pay higher 
for energy’ (representative of the Ministry of Energy)
What role off-grid? Beyond the issue of grid-connected energy  
is the question of how to meet the energy needs of the 70% or 
more of the population without access to the grid. Given limited 
grid-connectivity, off-grid solutions and mostly Solar Home 
Systems (SHS) have thrived in Kenya. But despite the market size 
and potential, only around 4.4% of total rural households (on and 
off grid) had an SHS by 2011.5
SHSs are still a niche technology which has not yet replaced the 
use of kerosene and batteries. Off-grid solar has advantages since 
it reduces demand for grid electricity. But the prevailing approach 
seems to be to largely to leave the off grid solar to the market and 
donors, other than through support to initiatives like the public 
building solar electrification programme of the Ministry of Energy 
and Rural Electrification Authority. Yet the evidence suggests that 
the apparent market success of SHSs has been on the basis of 
significant intervention and risk taking by public institutions in 
developing niche technologies, rather than private entities alone.6 
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Mainstreaming Climate Change
So how can climate change concerns be brought into this 
agenda? The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) is the main 
vehicle for integrating climate concerns with the LCPDP and 
V2030. It was developed in 2012 under the leadership of the 
Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources (MEMR) to enable 
Kenya reduce vulnerability to climate change and to improve the 
country’s ability to take advantage of the opportunities arising 
from climate finance. 
The CCAP was developed and guided by a multi-stakeholder, 
multidisciplinary taskforce called the National Climate Change 
Action Plan Task Force (NCCAPTF). A year-long participatory 
process involved the public sector, the private sector, academia, 
NGOs, the civil society and communities. A national climate fund 
was also proposed to support issues related to research and 
development on climate change issues and drive the policy on 
carbon investment and carbon trading. The different mitigation 
actions proposed by the CCAP are to be presented as NAMAs 
(Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) to the COP of the 
UNFCCC to secure climate finance for risk mitigation instruments, 
mostly for geothermal. Kenya has been one of the earliest 
recipients of fast start climate finance.
However, the Climate Change Authority Bill to embed the plan 
was then rejected by President Kibaki in 2013 because it was 
brought as a private members bill by civil society organisations 
and needed wider consultation. The CCAP’s greatest challenge  
in implementation then is that it is not backed by legislation. 
Though climate change issues were mainstreamed into the 
Medium Term Plan-2, a 5-year implementation tool of the 
Government, a key challenge remains how to more effectively 
integrate climate issues into energy planning. 
What role donors? Multilateral and bilateral development finance 
can help nurture the enabling conditions for CCD. Indeed, there is 
a wide perception that the low carbon energy access agenda is 
very donor driven. Donors are heavily involved in the Kenyan 
energy sector and like working with Kenya because it is more 
market orientated than many other countries in the region. 
Though the government sets the goals, donors do seem to have 
some influence over priorities in energy sector, including in some 
cases gaining access to the very highest echelons of government. 
The IFC also played a role in the revision of the 2013 Energy  
Policy  to its final draft through the identification of investment 
opportunities on renewable energy in the country. Donors  
meet with the Ministry of Energy every quarter to discuss the 
implementation of various energy initiatives or any policy 
requirement that is necessary for donor operations in the  
country. When working together the donors present a 
coordinated powerful force. 
Donors have also part financed domestic policy initiatives that 
might bring multiple CCD benefits such as promoting private 
sector participation in the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) scheme, for example. 
The German donor KFW provides a premium on top of the 
government set tariff, while the World Bank also provided  
some technical assistance to the FiT. 
Donor interest in Kenya’s energy sector is also driven by potential 
trade and investment openings for their own corporations. Where 
donor country companies and donor country governments 
interests are in clean energy in Kenya, there is scope for them  
to support CCD. Recent British trade missions and US interest  
in geothermal are notable here. 
Yet for donors to enhance CCD means not only promoting 
renewable energies, but also tackling energy poverty needs.  
For this reason the main donors support both big scale generation 
plus smaller scale investments. For example, the French 
government supports big geothermal and Compact Fluorescent 
Lighting (CFL) distribution projects. 
Going Local? Political economy of devolution: One area  
of uncertainty in terms of the future trajectory of CCD efforts is 
devolution set up under the Constitution of 2010. This has placed 
the issue of power over energy policy at the heart of debate and is 
giving momentum to energy sector reform. Devolution may 
involve some further unbundling and creation of regional energy 
companies and  bring about a greater democratisation of energy 
policy. Under devolution plans counties are supposed to be in 
charge of attracting investors, but will find it difficult to do so 
without control over energy. 
Energy Policy is being drafted to align with the new constitution 
on these terms. The Ministry of Energy is considered one of the 
most centralised of ministries, perhaps for good reason, as 
centralised planning for energy is necessary to an extent. But 
counties are demanding control over rural electrification planning 
and material resources to address grid extension and connection 
issues. In a blow to these aspirations, in August 2013 the 
Transitional Authority declared that rural electrification would not 
be devolved at this stage, prompting angry reaction from county 
governors. A battle is currently taking place over capacity of 
counties to fulfil these roles. 
Whether counties will be more responsive to the energy poverty 
needs of those they represent or not is unclear but certainly not 
to be assumed, even if many detect high levels of support for 
renewable energy.
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Political economy analysis usefully illustrates the conflicts, 
trade-offs and opportunities of simultaneously trying to 
reconcile poverty, mitigation and adaptation policy 
objectives. Key moments when these objectives are openly 
discussed and attempts made to reconcile and integrate them 
reveal power dynamics at work that need to understood and 
engaged. Examples include the process leading to the 
development of Kenya’s Climate Change Action Plan, the current 
review of Energy Policy and donor efforts to finance a lower 
carbon trajectory for Kenya’s energy sector.
Political economy analysis can also help to locate 
opportunities for change. It  is useful in understanding 
blockages to reform on the part of the incumbent regime, but 
also identifying opportunities for niche technologies and 
entrepreneurs to move things forward.
Political economy analysis usefully points to how and why 
some policy options are favoured over others: the relations  
of power which explain why some sources and technologies are 
privileged over others in terms of their fit with the interests of 
powerful domestic and external actors. Energy sources and 
technologies such as solar compete with growing investor, 
government and donor interest in geo-thermal and,  
increasingly, fossil fuels.
The trade-offs between climate change mitigation and low cost 
power appear to have been the easiest to resolve on one level in 
Kenya. Yet access to electricity is only one dimension of energy 
poverty. Pro-poor energy tends to be conflated with cheaper 
electricity prices whereas in many instances the drivers of  
policy are not pro-poor energy access concerns per se, but  
rather energy security concerns for the competitiveness of 
industry in Kenya.
The energy sector, therefore, faces deeply politicised 
questions of energy for whom? Industry v consumers; off-grid  
v on-grid; wealthy v poor consumers which imply important social 
and environmental trade-offs that institutions and policy-
processes have to manage. This is apparent around issues of cost 
recovery in tariffs and the conditions considered necessary for 
the creation of an investor friendly sector. At present there are  
few efforts in the Kenyan energy sector to cater for unprofitable 
consumers in the current model despite the development of new 
financial models to collect from poorer consumers at the ‘bottom 
of the pyramid’.
Adaptation has arisen as a concern in relation to ‘clean’ 
energy in Kenya largely in terms of climate impacts upon the 
water flows required for the supply of hydro energy. Yet the 
vulnerability of the national energy generation system is not the 
same as the vulnerability of the country’s citizens and their 
diverse energy service needs at a household level.
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Donors and international businesses are key actors working 
to shape the domestic politics of energy choices according  
to their mandates, which often include the promotion of lower 
carbon energy. Though they differ in terms of support for 
particular energy sources and technologies, there is a high  
degree of alignment among donors and between government 
and donors on the desirability and necessity of market-based 
approaches to tackling the countries energy challenges.
Overall it is important to recognise that in practice energy policy 
often has to be reactive and opportunistic rather than pro-active 
and planned. Circumstances, events, priorities and political 
coalitions mean that the domestic and international landscape 
within which energy policy is situated is constantly changing. This 
presents difficulties for the implementation of vision strategies or 
the realisation of mainstreaming goals in the longer-term Climate 
Change Action Plan.
An approach in which poverty, mitigation and adaptation are 
more balanced and effectively integrated will require working with 
and against the very powerful actors that benefit from and indeed 
seek to expand ‘climate un-compatible development’. This is so 
because the coalitions of the ‘winning and the willing’: those 
actors that stand to gain most from the transition to a lower 
carbon economy, are currently too weak to drive change in  
Kenya, as elsewhere.
The shifts of relations of power that this would imply will 
likely have to come from within Kenya. But donors and other 
external actors might be able to support domestic coalitions of 
change and beneficiaries from a lower carbon energy trajectory 
and tip the balance of power somewhat in favour of one set of 
actors over another. Helping to bring together and mobilise 
groups of business and civil society actors with a material stake  
in the success of a low carbon economic pathway could be a  
key contribution donors and others can make.
Business actors are crucial to the pursuit of CCD in shaping 
regulations that support or hinder CCD. For example, the Kenyan 
Renewable Energy Association (KEREA) lobbied successfully for 
the zero-tariff policy, alongside the big importers and 
manufacturers of solar and groups such as the Solar Technicians 
Association. They managed to get the buy-in of junior officers in 
Ministry of Energy, the Permanent Secretary and then the 
Minister. Building cross-government support for the measure was 
vital, including hosting a workshop to bring parliamentarians into 
the process. This case also highlights, however, the ease with 
which potentially positive policy change can be reversed, with  
VAT at 16% now placed back on solar since September 2013.
Though energy policy in Kenya has traditionally been highly 
centralised, it has become more consultative allowing a greater 
voice for larger and smaller businesses involved in promoting 
renewable energy. Whose voice is heard, and whose voice is 
heeded, will shape which technologies and energy sources are 
preferred by policy-makers.
A political economy analysis such as this provides a useful tool for 
those within and beyond Kenya wanting an understanding of the 
political landscape and terrain of power they have to navigate in 
order to affect change. 
This briefing was prepared by Peter Newell, Jon Phillips and  
Ana Pueyo based on a study in collaboration with the African 
Technology Policy Studies Network & funded by CDKN.
For further details please contact Prof. Peter Newell  
(P.J.Newell@sussex.ac.uk)
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